Europe’s multiple security strategies towards Africa by Styan, David
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Styan, David (2017) Europe’s multiple security strategies towards Africa. In:
Economides, S. and Sperling, J. (eds.) EU Security Strategies: Extending
the EU System of Security Governance. Routledge Studies in European
Security and Strategy. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. ISBN 9781138210417. (In
Press)
Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/19149/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
1 
 
ed.Ch.6_Styan. Africa1-DS260617.docx  Edits: 25.06.17 
 
Chapter 6 
Europe’s multiple security strategies towards Africa 
David Styan (Birkbeck College, University of London) 
 
Introduction 
The European Union’s attempts to ‘strategize’ its actions in Africa are frequently 
contradictory, largely because the formulation of strategy has occurred retrospectively. 
Strategies have been crafted to encompass a wide range of often pre-existing policy 
instruments and agencies, each with its own broad range of specific means, goals and ends. 
This is true for each of the three geographic dimensions - global, continental and regional - 
for which the EU has now formulated strategies in Africa. Thus a key challenge in examining 
security strategy in Africa is making sense of what lies beneath this thin spray-on ‘strategy 
sheen’. Has a semblance of strategic coherence simply been wafted across a myriad of 
competing European foreign policy objectives, loosely linked to the notion of ‘security’? 
This chapter argues that relations between the European Union and African states 
occupy a unique position in Europe’s ambitions to devise a credible ‘strategy’, when 
compared with the EU’s strategy towards other parts of the world. This is due to three 
specific characteristics of EU-Africa relations.  The first is that EU-Africa relations have 
spawned a uniquely dense, yet frequently contradictory, series of strategies. This is true both 
sectorally, in terms of the EU’s diverse policies on aid, trade, security, and governance, and 
geographically insofar as the EU deploys a different combination of programmes and policy 
instruments to diverse sub-regions within the African continent.  The second unique 
characteristic of EU-Africa security ties arises from the reality that since 2003 Africa has 
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served as an experimental theatre for many of the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) military missions.  Thus interventions in several civil wars in Africa have 
become Europe’s favoured terrain for joint-military experimentation and innovation; what we 
might term the ‘military laboratory’ characteristic of Brussels’ CSDP. 1 The EU’s embryonic 
forces have invariably acted in conjunction with other military actors. These include United 
Nations peace-keeping troops, as well as French, and increasingly United States’ forces2.  
French influence, both as the European power with by far the most extensive on-going 
military presence in Africa, and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, means 
that the EU clearly does not operate in Africa as an independent security actor, autonomous 
of its member states. Indeed, a key feature of EU strategy and actions in Africa is France’s 
centrality to many CSDP military initiatives in Africa, notably in the former French colonies 
of Chad, Mali and Central African Republic. The third unique characteristic of EU security 
strategy in Africa is that it is explicitly, repeatedly and insistently presented in Brussels as 
being the product of a ‘partnership’ of equals with African governments, however 
implausible that claim may be in reality.   
Before examining the broader context of the EU’s African strategy, I will briefly 
explore each of these characteristics in more detail. Firstly, strategic incoherence stems from 
the profusion and complexity of diverse strands of multiple priorities and strategies. It is not 
possible to evaluate EU-Africa strategy in the singular; there are numerous strategies and 
multiple policy priorities which frequently overlap and are often contradictory. The unwieldy 
policy circles of preferential trade and aid – which are the historical bedrock of EU-Africa 
ties – do not provide a stable foundation for the subsequent, post-Cold War policy edifice 
encompassing issues of political conditionality, governance and rights. Nor can the 
European’s more recent concerns with security, border control and outward migration from 
Africa be easily squared with previous strategies of aid, trade or governance. Thus the fluidity 
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of relative strategic priorities is a key factor when it comes to assessing either the long-term 
coherence or effectiveness of EU strategy. Such incoherence is exacerbated by the shifting 
priorities and short shelf-life of Brussels’ strategies.  Most recently, in the 2016 Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) (EEAS 2016a), the 
EU adopted a strategic policy goal of stalling irregular migration across the Mediterranean 
and facilitating the forcible return of migrants; this goal was bolted onto a pre-existing broad 
array of policy objectives.  
The second reason that EU-Africa relations hold a unique place in any practical 
evaluation of European strategizing is that the majority of actual CSDP military missions 
since 2003 have been staged on the African continent. To evaluate the effectiveness of the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) since its inception in 2003, one must therefore examine 
Europe’s dozen or so military engagements in Africa. The very first EU military intervention, 
Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was triggered even before the ESS 
was published in 2003. The subsequent decade brought a steady expansion of such 
operations; by 2016 there had been 14 CSDP missions in Africa. These included seven actual 
military missions, plus, since 2007, the large-scale, EU-funded African Union mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM reflects a central aspect of the evolving EU strategic practice 
in Africa whereby Europe increasingly finances the subcontracting of security work to 
African troops (Tardy 2016).   
The third reason why Africa occupies a unique place in EU strategy is the manner in 
which EU-Africa ties are invariably, and somewhat ostentatiously, presented as reflecting a 
‘partnership’. Here the repeated insistence that the strategy is the outcome of consensual 
negotiations between equal partners serves largely to highlight precisely the opposite. The 
legacy of two centuries of colonialism reflects the historic imbalance of power, financial 
wherewithal and influence between the two continents. This is most pressing in terms of the 
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practical overhang of what has been for most African states their main institutional policy 
link to the EU, the Lomé accords (1975) and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement (2000).  
They provide the framework for both the principal aid transfers to Africa, via successive 
European Development Fund mechanisms, as well as shaping trade ties between the two 
continents.  They are currently the subject of protracted re-negotiation in the form of the 
(often controversial) WTO-compatible ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’.  
The current emphasis on ‘Strategic Partnership’ is explicitly an attempt to efface the 
highly unequal donor—recipient relationship which continues to characterize post-colonial 
ties between Europe and Africa.  Stark economic realities mean that strategy is written and 
above all financed in Europe. This is most explicitly evident in relation to the ‘African Peace 
and Security Architecture’ dimension of the new security division of labour (see below).   
This chapter is largely an exploration of the tensions and contradictions surrounding 
the three core characteristics of the EU strategy for Africa.  It is structured in three 
substantive sections. Part one presents the context, scope, genesis, and evolution of EU 
strategies towards 54 African states and their 1.2bn inhabitants.  It analyses the shifts in 
European strategic approaches towards Africa between the original 2003 ESS and its latest 
iteration, the 2016 EUGS.  Part two then briefly examines selected aspects of actual strategic 
practices of CSDP in Africa.  It focuses on the specific regional policy towards the Horn of 
Africa, where the EU’s longest running, most substantial CSDP mission, the EU’s anti-piracy 
maritime force EUNAVFOR operates.  At the same time, the EU trains and finances within 
Somalia and neighbouring states the 20,000 African Union troops staffing the AMISOM 
mission. It also runs two additional CSDP missions of its own in Somalia. The Horn of 
Africa thus arguably represents the largest and most tangible aspect of ‘security partnership’ 
between Africans and Europeans. The third and final substantive section then evaluates the 
outcomes of these strategic interventions framed by two questions: Does the EU strategy in 
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Africa attain its declared goals? Is it likely that the formulation or implementation of grand 
strategy will make either Africans or Europeans more secure as the 21
st
 century progresses?   
The context, scope, genesis and evolution of EU-Africa strategies 
The EU itself defines its ties with the African nations in the following manner:  
EU-Africa relations are based on the 2000 Cotonou Agreement with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, which grew out of the 1975 Lomé 
Convention. Africa-EU relations are framed by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
(JAES) adopted by 80 African and European Heads of State and Government at 
the Lisbon Summit in 2007. This Strategy encompasses the Africa-EU 
Partnership, the political framework which defines bilateral relations. Its goal is a 
partnership between equals that will jointly tackle issues of mutual concern. It 
was reaffirmed with a positive spin at the 4th EU-Africa Summit held in April 
2014 in Brussels (European  Commission 2005). 
The need for a new ‘positive spin’ reflected lacklustre progress on meaningful cooperation 
post-Lisbon, and was the impetus for what was effectively a relaunch of the ‘Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy’ in Brussels in 2014. Those at the summit adopted a “2014-2017 roadmap” to attain 
the new strategic objectives established at the Brussels summit. This established five 
“strategic policy priorities”:  peace and security; democracy, good governance and human 
rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth; and finally, 
continental integration. 
 It is the first priority that has occupied much strategizing since 2014 and is the main 
focus here. The bulk of expenditure in this area is channelled via the African Peace Facility 
(APF) and the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic 
(MISCA). These ‘African-led’ peacekeeping operations ostensibly function within an 
overarching policy framework of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The 
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strategic aim of coordinating between EU and African Union agencies in order to boost 
African capacities and mechanisms with the aim of preventing and managing conflicts and 
crises is examined in relation to the broader notion of ‘partnership’ below.  
Even this surface view of EU strategic priorities highlights the challenge of forging a 
comprehensive or coherent overarching ‘strategy’ to encompass and structure very diverse 
activities. This is further complicated by the fact that in practice there are a series of distinct 
security strategies vying for Brussels’ attention in several distinct geographic dimensions. 
The European Union’s ties with African states are inscribed within multiple, interlocking 
strategic frameworks. Schematically these can be seen to operate on three distinct geographic 
dimensions; global, continental and (sub-)regional. 
Before detailing this diversity of strategies towards Africa, we should not lose sight of 
the fact that in reality, there is a fourth dimension which in practical policy terms is rather 
more important. This is the country-specific strategy framework which shapes the European 
Commission’s bilateral ties with individual states. In practice most EU finance, which 
underpins EU-Africa security strategy, passes via individual African exchequers, i.e. they are 
spent at the national level. National spending priorities, in turn, are outlined in mutually 
agreed upon a ‘National Indicative Programme’ (NIP). However, given that each NIP is the 
outcome of complex bi-lateral bargaining between donor and recipient, usually involving 
hundreds of detailed domestic budget lines, the overarching ‘security strategy’ is invariably 
absent from such NIP documents
3
. 
This level of domestic policy and expenditure is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, when considering broader security strategy discourses, it is important to note that, 
as highlighted at the outset, most aspects of EU peace and security policy and finance 
towards individual African states continues to be funnelled through what was originally an 
aid and trade frameworks.  As such, the underlying politics and power relations between the 
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two regions largely reflect the tensions of what John Ravenhill (1985), in his original analysis 
of the politics of EU-ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific states 
4
) trade deals, termed “collective 
clientalism” (see also Whiteman 1998).  The underlying contradictions between European 
trade protectionism, notably against Africa’s agricultural producers, and Europe’s professed 
economic liberalism remains at the heart of such tensions (Taylor 2016).  
 
What are the multiple strategies the EU operates at each geographic dimension in 
Africa?  Globally, Africa features prominently in successive elaborations of Europe’s global 
strategy towards neighbouring continents with which Europe has extensive exchanges 
(Council of the EU 2003, EEAS 2016a). There are then several distinct strands of ‘Africa 
Strategies’ defined at a continental level. Here the key document is the ‘Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy (JAES)’, endorsed by 80 African and European governments at the Lisbon Summit 
in 2007. This over-arching strategy encompasses the Africa-EU Partnership and is examined 
in more detail below.  Finally there are elaborate EU strategies towards selected sub-regions 
of Africa, notably for the Sahel and Horn of Africa.
5
  Since 2011 a separate Sahel Strategy 
has sought to partially provide a framework for EU actions towards the states of Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger (EEAS 2011) . Each is a former French colony with 
on-going close ties to Paris. France, like the US, has considerably increased its military 
presence in these states, particularly since the 2012-13 Islamist insurgency in Mali, and 
remains the principal bilateral donor to the region. As such Paris tends to be the dominant 
actor in terms of both EU and other multilateral initiatives in the Sahel. However, the Sahel 
Strategy covers programmes on such as security, migration, terrorism as well as humanitarian 
and long-term development issues and since 2015 has had an associated ‘Regional Action 
Plan’.  The second principal sub-regional policy for Africa is its Horn of Africa strategy, 
adopted in 2012. Both strategies are overseen by Special Representatives in Brussels.
7
  The 
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genesis and role of the Horn of Africa strategy  is examined in more detail in section three 
below.  
As noted earlier, the third notable factor characterising ties between the EU and Africa 
is the notion of ‘partnership’. In 2007, the specific intercontinental EU-Africa partnership 
agreement was signed. This reflected the gestation of a reformed set of EU-Africa relations 
that occurred during process of reformatting the Organisation of African Unity via its 
metamorphosis into the African Union between 1999-2002. These included the (donor-
steered) ‘New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)’ and the inaugural EU-Africa 
summit in Cairo in 2000.  
The notion of partnership was prominent in the 2005 EU ‘Strategy for Africa’ 
documents, subsequently endorsed as the ‘JAES’ in Lisbon. It reflected, indeed earnestly 
promoted, the view prevalent among European elites that bilateral ties between European and 
African states and continents might rest on mutually beneficial foundations. This Lisbon 
document declared: 
The purpose of the EU’s action is to work in partnership with the nations of 
Africa to promote peace and prosperity for all their citizens […] The strategy will 
further reinforce the basic principles that govern this relationship, most 
prominently equality, partnership and ownership… (European Commission 2005, 
emphasis added).  
This notion of ‘partnership’ has become even more prominent in the discourses, actions and 
strategies concerning security that have evolved in the decade since the 2007 ‘Joint Africa-
EU Strategy’ was signed in Lisbon. As Thierry Tardy (2016: 1) notes, the term partnership 
sought to reflect a new “Euro-African consensus on values, interests and strategic 
objectives”, replacing the donor—recipient ties of dependency with at least notional 
economic equality and political parity. As noted already, in the security domain partnership is 
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embodied most tangibly in the EU’s backing of the ‘African Peace and Security Architecture’ 
via its funding of the APF to the tune of €1bn in recent years. The idea of it originated in 
2003, and came to embody the tangible aspect of the EU’s commitment to “peace and 
security” subsequently sketched in its 2005 ‘Strategy for Africa’ document (European 
Commission 2005).  
Above all the APF has funded African Union (AU) military missions in Somalia, 
Mali, and Guinea Bissau – essentially by covering contributing states’ operational costs. 
From 2015 similar EU funding mechanisms were adopted under the APF for missions in the 
Central African Republic and the Lake Chad basin. In addition it provides military training 
and ‘capacity building’ for a range of defence activities as well as for existing Regional 
Economic Communities in Africa, notably the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in the Sahel and west, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) in the Horn of Africa.  It also is the key vehicle for European financial support for 
the AU Commission itself.  
Viewed objectively, this appears to be more an emerging division of labour and 
finance rather than ‘partnership’.  Europe pays to train and maintain the executive of a 
regional body in its own image – the African Union – which in turn organizes military 
peacekeeping on the African continent, staffed by African troops, which the European Union 
agrees to bankroll. Thus it is far from clear to what degree this division of labour, effectively 
an EU policy of subcontracting security roles in the Horn of Africa, can be accurately viewed 
either as a partnership between equals or to reflect a joint-strategy. This arrangement prompts 
Tardy (2016: 3) to argue that that “the notion of strategic partnership that implies 
convergence on interests and methods cannot be easily applied to EU-AU relations”, a point 
we will return to when assessing the strategic outcomes of such a strategy. 
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The EU’s shifting strategies towards Africa: 2003-17.  How have multi-level 
security strategies towards Africa evolved and what is their content? The previous section 
schematically divided EU strategizing towards sub-Saharan Africa into three distinct 
geographic spheres. In this section we focus primarily on the manner in which the EU has 
incorporated African issues into the first - global - policy sphere, via successive iterations of 
its global strategizing. 
Africa features in diverse ways in the evolving series of EU global strategy 
documents, which ostensibly seek to align strategy towards Africa within the broader context 
of CSDP’s goals.  We will briefly examine coverage of Africa in the two key strategic 
documents, the 2003 ESS and the 2016 EUGS.  However, it is worth noting that the July 2016 
document was preceded by a longer, and on Africa slightly more detailed, 2015 discussion 
document (European Union 2015). This was adopted by the European Parliament after debate 
in April 2016 and contains greater detail on African policies. 
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A preliminary observation is in order for each of these strategy documents. Firstly, the 
key characteristic is that the often tortuous language of each reflects the acute tensions 
between the essentially normative, liberal aspirations of the EU on the one hand, and the need 
for practical strategic prioritization, guidance and legitimacy for its growing number of 
military actions on the other. It is hard not to conclude that such tension is particularly acute 
between EU actions in sub-Saharan Africa, where the bulk of military missions is located, 
and the liberal aspirations dominating the language of those strategy documents.   
As such this tension reflects what Adrian Hyde-Price (2008) has termed the tendency 
of the EU to act as “neurotic centaur” revealing the limitations of the EU as a strategic actor. 
On the one hand, the EU foreign policy beast views the unstable world through a cold and 
rational Realpolitik. This viewpoint acknowledges that an effective external policy requires 
the willingness to use military power in the service of broader diplomatic objectives when 
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necessary. Yet the EU’s rhetoric reflects the view offered by its normative, rose-tinted liberal 
eye that is flatters its domestic European audience.  This means that strategy all too often is, 
in Hyde-Price’s words “ham-strung by stuff on soft power” and inhibits the development of a 
viable grand strategy based on “a common strategic culture which goes beyond the platitudes 
of the [2003] ESS” (Hyde-Price 2008: 154).   
Wading through strategy documents attempting to discern what strategy towards 
Africa actually consists of, one is tempted to extend Hyde-Price’s image and argue that when 
it comes to policy in Africa, the EU centaur shows disturbing signs of bipolar disorder 
compounded by schizophrenia. What does the 2003 ESS actually say about Africa and from 
where does the confusion stem? The succinct document was drafted shortly after the 
September 2001 attacks upon the United States and the EU’s manifest failures in the Balkans. 
As such it focuses on both terrorist and military threats to Europe. On Africa, it opens with 
the observation that African “countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, 
insecurity and poverty [and that] security is a precondition of development” and later notes 
the threats arising from regional conflicts in Africa’s Great Lakes Region and state failure in 
Somalia and Liberia (Council of the EU 2003). The ESS lauds the role of regional bodies in 
strengthening global governance and explicitly mentions the AU. The document also 
pointedly calls for the EU to develop “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when 
necessary, robust intervention” (ibid.). Lastly, it also argues that if strategy is to be 
successful, there must be greater policy coherence across EU overseas policies, including 
coordinating of the European Development Fund priorities with CSDP (Council of the eU 
2003:  9, 11 and 13).   
A dozen years on, the much anticipated EUGS was published in 2016 just weeks after 
the referendum in the United Kingdom. As such it differs somewhat from the draft discussion 
version published in late 2015 and debated by the European Parliament in April 2016.  
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Frederica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, notes in her forward to the EUGS that “Global” refers not simply to 
geographical scope but also the broad array of policies and tools at the Union’s disposal, 
emphasizing that the projection of ‘hard’ military power is as central to the Union’s work as 
the ‘soft’, civilian aspects of EU policies. The 2016 strategy defined five priority objectives 
for future EU action; three of these relate to African states, albeit often somewhat nebulously.  
The first, tellingly, is the desire to “develop more effective migration policies” for the EU and 
its partners. Secondly the Union aspires to prioritise “an integrated approach to conflicts. 
Later the document refines this to the notion of a “comprehensive approach to conflicts and 
crises” ( EEAS 2016s : 34); Libya is mentioned explicitly, but this priority clearly encompasses 
the EU’s active military missions in Africa [see Table 6.1]. 
[Table 6.1 here] 
Thirdly, the 2016 strategy stresses the importance of “Cooperative Regional Orders” 
(EEAS 2016a: 9-10). It is under this ‘Regional Order’ rubric that the few specifics of policy 
towards Africa feature in the body of the sixty-page document. Under the characteristically 
aspirational heading of “A peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa” 
(ibid.: 34), where, after referring to numerous conflicts in the Middle East, the document 
notes the “growing interconnections between both North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and 
the states of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East“ In both cases, on closer inspection these 
appear to be thinly veiled references to migration corridors: notably those between Niger-
Libya and between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.  
Alongside the new catch-all aid industry nostrum of ‘resilience’, migration controls 
feature extensively in the final version of the 2016 EUGS.  The term ‘resilience’ has been 
widely embraced by the development industry since 2015, when the Millennium 
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Development Goals were replaced with a new set of ‘sustainability’ targets.  Thus in the 
section entitled ‘State and Societal Resilience to our East and South’, the EU claims that 
Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, 
resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and 
recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us and countries in our 
surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant 
societies. […] Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU will adopt a 
joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, 
investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies, as well as 
improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States (EEAS 
2016a:23) ED:  Section 3.2, page 23). 
Since the 2014 launch of the ‘JEAS’ and its associated policy roadmap, the issue of migration 
control has becoming increasingly prominent in EU policies towards Africa. These are often 
conveyed uneasily in a ‘migration-development’ vocabulary, reflecting the dissonance 
between two realities: that remittance flows from overseas workers are now crucial to the 
economic functioning of many African states and that European leaders seek to stem the 
migrant flows which generate them. Thus post-2014 the EU launched various ‘migration and 
development’ policy initiatives, notably the Rabat and Khartoum processes, which aim to 
combat irregular migration from west and east Africa respectively. These were reinforced by 
an emergency EU-Africa ‘migration summit’ held in Valetta in 2015. This was prompted by 
the sharp increase in deaths of migrants crossing the Mediterranean in 2014-15. Valetta 
marked the launch of a new ‘Emergency Trust Fund for Africa’ aimed at stemming 
migration. 
The new migration focus has clearly influenced the 2016 EUGS, where migration and 
resilience tropes occasionally converge: 
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A special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of 
migrants and refugees. […] Together with countries of origin and transit, we will 
develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, 
diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and 
return. Through development, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation 
we will work with countries of origin to address and prevent the root causes of 
displacement, manage migration, and fight trans-border crime (EEAS 2016a: 24). 
As a strategy this is contradictory, particularly in its fudging of the benefits of 
migration upon household and national economies via the enhancement of mobility, and the 
fact that the Trust Fund mechanism appears designed primarily to deter and control migrant 
flows, rather than promote and better regulate them. What is the link between ‘resilience’ and 
migration; does more migration enhance it?  It is equally unclear what exactly African states 
are supposed to be ‘resilient’ against (drought, war, or indeed migratory pressures 
themselves…?). The EUGS appears to assume a link between ‘conflict’ and migration:    
The EU will therefore pursue a multi-phased approach, acting at all stages of the 
conflict cycle. We will invest in prevention, resolution and stabilisation, and 
together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-
made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal 
migration, border management, readmission and return. We will work with our 
international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity 
(EEAS 2016a: 24). 
As in 2003, the EU’s emphasis in partnering in Africa with regional bodies is also a 
prominent feature of the 2016 strategy. Claiming “[T]he EU will intensify its support for and 
cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa […and will …] invest in 
African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity. We will 
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intensify cooperation with and support for the African Union, as well as ECOWAS, the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development in eastern Africa, and the East African 
Community, among others “ (EEAS 2016a: 34). Finally, the economic and trade dimensions 
do feature in the EUGS, albeit now somewhat overshadowed by concerns of migration and 
crises. Thus claiming that the EU has a duty to “enhance our efforts to stimulate growth and 
jobs in Africa” EEAS 2016a: 36, via Cotonou’s chosen successor policies, Economic 
Partnership Agreements. These the EUGS suggests;  
can spur African integration and mobility, and encourage Africa’s full and 
equitable participation in global value chains. A quantum leap in European 
investment in Africa is also needed to support sustainable development. We will 
build stronger links between our trade, development and security policies in 
Africa, and blend development efforts with work on migration, health, education, 
energy and climate, science and technology, notably to improve food security. 
We will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa, and assist 
African organisations’ work on conflict prevention, counter- terrorism and 
organised crime, migration and border management. We will do so through 
diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as trust funds to back up regional 
strategies (EEAS 2016a: 36). 
Trying to map this latest iteration of EU grand strategy to actual actions in Africa is 
problematic. The 2016 Strategy’s exhortative conclusion, a string of gerunds— reforming, 
investing, implementing, deepening widening, developing, partnering...—reads as aspirational 
waffle. Indeed, it is tempting to view the document’s reliance upon imprecise terms such as 
‘resilience’ as reflecting a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach, a disconnect between the 
EU’s myriad policy presence, with multiple programmes and expenditures in African states, 
and the broad justifications of them among policy makers and strategists in Brussels. It is, to 
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adapt a very old view of European Political Cooperation in Brussels, as if the procedure of 
drafting strategies acts as a substitute for policy itself or at least practical policy coordination 
(Allen and Wallace 1977: 227-248).  
 
Strategic Practices:  the regional strategy for the Horn of Africa.    
How has the EU sought to formulate strategy at a regional level within Africa? This 
section briefly examines regional strategic practices of CSDP by focussing on policies in the 
Horn of Africa.  Regional strategizing seeks to coordinate multiple European foreign policy 
and military initiatives in neighbouring states.  However, on critical inspection, the relatively 
recent adoption of regional EU strategies for specific regions within Africa – as for the Horn 
or Sahel – still risks veiling a spurious façade of cohesion over what are often disparate 
actions by different EU agencies within one region.  
The Horn is the location of the EU’s longest running, most substantial CSDP mission; 
the anti-piracy force EUNAVFOR’s Operation Atalanta, patrolling the coasts of Somalia and 
the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile in Somalia itself in recent years the EU has run two CSFP 
missions of its own, its Training Mission Somalia (EUTM), and coastguard training via 
EUCAP Nestor. Between 2012 and early 2017 EUCAP Nestor provided ‘Regional Maritime 
Capacity Building’ for states of the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. Brussels 
additionally invests €250m per annum to pay for the 22,000 troops participating in 
AMISOM. Currently this is by far the largest and most tangible aspect of ‘security 
partnership’ between Africa and Europe and is at the heart of EU-AU military ties. This 
practical manifestation of the EU- AU partnership functions via the APSA and related 
African peace-keeping operations. Its finance, via the APF has been funded from the 
European Development Fund (EDF) since 2004. In addition to AMISOM, since March 2015 
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this funding model, whereby some aid flows can be channelled into military activities, has 
also funded an EU Military Assistance Mission - EUMAM – in Central African Republic.  
In terms of EU security practice in Africa, one can thus discern a strategic shift, with 
expenditure on the earlier, stand-alone CSDP military missions being replaced by EU funding 
for capacity building, training and – in the case of AMISOM – directly paying the wages of 
African troops. While the term is not used in EU strategy circles, this practice flags the 
emergence of a sub-contracting model. The EU prefers to bankroll African forces in the hope 
they can shore-up fragile state structures, as in Somalia or the Central African Republic, 
rather than send European troops.
9
  This shift complements recent attempts to better 
coordinate strategy and policies at a regional level within Africa. There are two geographic 
areas for which the EU has adopted sub-continental strategy documents and region-specific 
policy frameworks. The first relates to the Horn of Africa. This policy, agreed in 2012 and 
four years after the start of the EUNAVFOR anti-piracy mission off Somalia, aimed to lend 
coherence and direction to disparate EU missions and budget lines in Ethiopia, Somalia and 
neighbouring states (European Council of the EU 2011). 
The second principal sub-regional strategy in Africa relates to the Sahel, with a Sahel 
strategy adopted in 2011 that is designed to frame EU relations with Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania and Niger. A Sahel Regional Action Plan (RAP) was adopted in 2015. Both 
the Horn of Africa and Sahel regional strategies have European External Action Service 
(EEAS) Special Representatives attached to them. In the Horn of Africa, since 2012 EU 
policies have in theory been coordinated within a ‘Comprehensive Approach’, which 
provides a wide array of humanitarian, developmental and military assistance; its expenditure 
and actions operating within an overarching ‘Strategic Framework’ (Council of the EU 2011 . 
In terms of the formulation of strategy towards the multiple CSDP activities and 
missions in the Horn, the anchor of the strategy is EUNAVFOR’s Operation Atalanta. This 
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was the first EU naval mission and has been in continuous operation since late 2008, with its 
mandate now extended to 2018.
11
 As such, it is both the largest and longest CSDP mission 
related to Africa. It is tasked with both anti-piracy operations and the escort of World Food 
Programme food aid deliveries to Somalia. 
In terms of EU security strategy, it is important to note that Operation Atalanta is 
simultaneously the central element in the 2014 ‘European Union Maritime Security Strategy’ 
(MSS) (Council of the EU 2014). The debate informing the MSS is instructive for the wider 
concerns of this volume in that it explicitly engaged with the hard power question of where 
do Europe’s strategic interests lie in terms of its frontiers? Clearly if CSDP is about strategic 
interests, the EU needs first to define such interests, and then seek the means to defend them. 
The MSS does precisely this, unlike the EU’s diverse terrestrial military missions and Africa 
strategies discussed here. 
Some argue the innovative nature of Europe’s anti-piracy force off the Horn of Africa 
is precisely this; the pursuit of the EU’s strategic interests expressed in the naval idiom of 
dispatching surface combatants to protect the shipping lanes through which the bulk of 
Europe’s oil supplies and consumer goods pass. As such the EU is explicitly defining and 
defending militarily its core interests. This is quite distinct from pursuing ‘humanitarian’ or 
other normative objectives, the so-called Petersberg tasks, which have been the primary 
rationale of other EU CSDP missions in Africa.
12
 Germond (2011: 573) argues that “[t]he 
EU’s own security now strongly depends on the security (or securing) of others and the 
securing of areas where threats originate and where the EU’s interests are threatened”. This 
implies that the EU’s first line of defence is often extra-European, thus the security 
implications of the EU’s maritime borders are exceedingly elastic. It also means that “[t]he 
maritime margins represent an ideal opportunity to extend the EU’s competences and power, 
because no direct interference with another sovereign state’s territory or its politics and 
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policies is required” (Council of the EU 2011: 574).  When the MSS was launched in 2014, 
EUNAVFOR in the Horn was the sole EU naval operation. As such it provided a template for 
the subsequent sea-borne migration control mission: Operation Sophia, the EU naval force in 
the Mediterranean in 2015.
13
 
In terms of the EU’s regional concerns of the Horn of Africa, EUNAVFOR should be 
placed within a broader perspective of integrated European policy towards Somalia and the 
Horn of Africa. Viewing the anti-piracy mission as one element of a European regional 
policy towards the Horn of Africa as a whole, it is far from clear to what degree the diverse 
policy actions are successfully coordinated. CSDP operations in the Horn have three primary 
dimensions: two maritime, one terrestrial. To that end, the other two main CSDP missions in 
region have been EUCAP Nestor and the EUTM. However, the framework and the Special 
Representative have a far broader remit than just these maritime and training missions. They 
aim to improve liaison and coordination between these three CSDP missions and the far 
broader EU aid and associated programmes in the Horn as well as coordination with the 
myriad of other leading multilateral actors implementing aid, civilian and military 
programmes in the Horn of Africa.
14
  
 
In terms of intra-EU bureaucratic politics, the key strategy issue here is that such aid 
programmes are the prerogative of the longstanding and powerful Commission's Directorate-
General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO). This, at least 
nominally, is under the relatively new umbrella of High Representative Mogherini, who has 
responsibility to coordinate all Commissioners with external relations portfolios, in part via 
the Commission's Group on External Action, which aims forge a common strategy for EU 
actions globally.
15
  However, DEVCO’s structures are older, better funded and partly 
autonomous from the embryonic EEAS. 
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This begs the broader question as to the purpose of strategy:  To what degree are the 
EU’s military missions integrated with wider EU regional objectives, including aid and 
development spending via DEVCO, in Africa?  This question can be posed for any of the EU 
missions in Africa, be it in Congo, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR) or Mali, but is 
particularly intriguing for EUNAVFOR, as a maritime mission that solely addresses the 
negative externalities—piracy and interference with food aid to the region—of the collapse of 
the Somali state. Violence in Somalia in turn has severe implications for the Horn of Africa 
as a whole, where the EU itself, as well as several of its larger members, have significant 
stakes as major donors of both civil and military aid to states such as Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Djibouti and Southern Sudan.  
Policy coordination and coherence issues are even more complex when we turn to the 
broader EU presence in the Horn of Africa, which in financial terms is far larger than the 
CSDP programmes. 
16
 On the aid front, the Commission floated in 2012 a new ‘Action Plan 
for the Horn of Africa’, dubbed ‘Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience’ (SHARE). SHARE 
envisaged that the Strategic Framework’s would shape policy coordination between the other 
key European actors, including the EU’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) as well as DEVCO, and link thereby short-
term humanitarian aid with longer-term development agencies. Highlighting the EU’s 
operational organisational complexity further, this in turn built upon the ‘Instrument for 
Stability’, a coordination and finance structure dating from 2007, which aimed to harmonise 
the Commission’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building more 
broadly and coincided with the launching of the ‘EU-Africa Strategy’.  
Since 2012, the EU has elaborated complex coordination mechanisms across the 
diverse CSDP and other programmes through which it is present in the Horn of Africa. 
Despite the elaborate Strategic Framework and appointment of the Special Representative, in 
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the Horn it is not clear whether there is an effective, clear sub-regional strategy.  Indeed the 
EU itself is mindful of this; having experimented for five years with its regional strategy, in 
early 2017 Brussels announced a reformatting of CSDP activities in the Horn, EUCAP-
Nestor becoming EUCAP-Somalia, concentrating solely on Somali coastal capacity.
17
 
 
Multiple initiatives:  strategy and security impact 
This final section evaluates a few outcomes of selected strategic interventions. The 
previous sections have highlighted the breadth and diversity of the EU’s various policies and 
goals in Africa, suggesting that in practice a unified, and largely retrospective, ‘Security 
Strategy’, such as that sketched in the EUGS of 2016, cannot meaningfully encompass such a 
wide range of EU programmes and objectives. This makes any generalised evaluation of goal 
attainment inherently problematic. However, we can attempt a brief and partial assessment in 
three policy domains related to security strategies in policy areas where the EU has 
significant financial investments in Africa: peacekeeping; anti-piracy activities and the 
management of irregular migration. 
In terms of peacekeeping, two aspects stand-out; the French role and the shift to 
training and funding of African armies.  The first is the degree to which the origins and 
outcomes of successive individual CSDP military missions in Africa reflected the policy 
priorities of France. France is both the EU state with the largest on-going bi-lateral military 
engagement in Africa, and the UN Security Council member most often charged with the 
military stabilization of successive ‘complex emergencies’ in African states. 18 These include 
missions in Chad, the CAR and Mali. As such the EU’s security priorities in significant parts 
of Africa can be seen as reflecting the national policy preferences of Paris, and to promote 
pan-European military peacekeeping forces in order to complement United Nations 
multilateral forces. Paris remains tied to many former colonies in Africa via defence accords.  
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As such, it has a financial and strategic interest in devolving some of its historical African 
security responsibilities to the EU or UN.  There are several examples of it having done so.  
In 2008, for example, the EU deployed 3,000 troops to its EUFOR Chad-CAR military 
mission. This mission aimed to improve security for refugees along the Chad-Darfur border, 
while complementing longstanding military support for Chad’s President who faced rebel 
insurgents from the border region. While the EU force comprised significant Irish and Polish 
troop contingents, in reality it was spearheaded and facilitated by French troops and logistics 
based permanently in Chad. After two years it handed authority to a short-lived United 
Nations mission, which was equally dependent on France. In terms of outcomes, the presence 
of EU and then UN troops made little significant difference to the security or humanitarian 
situation in Chad (Styan 2012; Grevy, Helly and Keohane 2009). However, what was at the 
time the EU’s largest military expedition was hailed in both Brussels and the UN as a 
resounding success in terms of military cooperation and force deployment by a pan-European 
force able to operate in coordination with UN peacekeepers. Five years earlier the EU 
Artemis mission in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo had in reality played a similar 
‘bridging’ role enabling the subsequent deployment of a larger UN force. More recent EU 
military training missions, in Somalia from 2010 and then Mali in 2013, effectively allowed 
the EU to provide finance and military expertise to support African national and multilateral 
forces. In both cases, these operations were French-led from its base in neighbouring Djibouti 
in the case of Somalia, then as the lead force combating Islamist forces in Mali under its 
Operation Serval.  
These examples relate to the second aspect of EU peacekeeping and the attainment of 
strategic objectives; the EU’s growing role as a trainer and financier of African armies 
involved in multilateral missions on the continent.  This role does not feature prominently in 
the official presentation of EU strategy in Africa, as we have seen. In practice, it is the EDF’s 
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financing of the APF since 2004 which – alongside the EU’s own military missions such as 
those outlined above - has been the most tangible manifestation of Brussels strategic military 
intent in Africa. Thus, the financing of AMISOM in Somalia and the more recent and smaller 
military assistance mission in CAR both meet the EU’s headline “peace and security” 
strategic objectives, as well as providing a tangible manifestation of “partnership” and the 
principle of “African ownership” (EEAS 2016.  
The twin areas of anti-piracy and maritime strategy provide a rare policy domain in 
which unambiguous success can be registered. The incidence of piracy declined dramatically 
in the region after the launch of EUNAVFOR in 2008. While this joint-EU naval mission is 
just one of several multilateral initiatives to secure shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean, the EU force has played a central role. Although enforcement is not the sole 
reason for the decline in piracy, this EU mission can be said to have fulfilled its declared 
strategic objectives. In addition, EUNAVFOR has demonstrated Brussels ability to mobilise, 
coordinate and deploy pan-European naval resources over a sustained period, enhancing the 
coherence and credibility of CSDP. EUNAVFOR’s success is recognised as a major factor 
underpinning the EU’s MSS (Germond 2011; Styan 2016), which as noted above is in part 
premised on the argument that the EU’s strategic interests extend well beyond the EU’s 
frontiers and encapsulate extra-European strategic interests such as shipping lanes.  
In terms of the links between migration and ESS in Africa, the evidence is both 
thinner and less conclusive. The 2014 EU-Africa Summit did adopt a ‘Joint Declaration on 
Migration and Mobility’ and an associated ‘Action Plan for 2014-2017’. These included 
initiatives to reduce the costs of remittances, boost labour mobility and enhance cooperation 
on irregular migration and trafficking. These initiatives were also accompanied by a 
‘Migration and Mobility Dialogue’. However, these broad migration objectives and initiatives 
were largely eclipsed by the sharp increase in illegal migration and deaths across the 
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Mediterranean from Libya’s lawless coastline as well as by the migrant flows from Syria and 
Turkey. A sense of escalating crisis in 2015 triggered a series of ad-hoc EU actions to boost 
surveillance, rescue and control of African migrants. An ad-hoc Africa-Europe Summit on 
Migration held in Valetta in November 2015 prompted further policy changes, including a 
€1.8 bn Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.19  This initiative aimed “to tackle root causes of 
irregular migration” and in mid-2016 the EU signed an associated ‘Partnership Framework’ 
for projects in five African states (Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia) under the 
Trust Fund. Speaking in late 2016 Federica Mogherini claimed some success for the 
partnership and associated ‘Framework’. 20 However, strategic policy coherence towards 
questions of migration and asylum, either in Brussels or among EU members, was strained 
and limited post-Valetta.  Greece and Italy continued to bear the brunt of migratory pressures; 
Italy eventually signed its own bilateral deal with Libya to try and stem irregular African 
migration in February 2017.  
 
Conclusion 
It is illusory to expect that the EU could formulate a coherent, unitary strategic 
approach to Africa’s diverse states, peoples and regions.  EU strategies towards its direct 
neighbours, for example the Balkan or Mediterranean states, provide the basis for focussed, 
feasible policy approaches. Each neighbouring geographic area is relatively well-defined and 
EU states have clear, contingent policy interests there. Africa is different. Whereas the nine 
states of the Western Balkans have around 35 million inhabitants with a shared history, 
Africa’s highly disparate 54 states contain well over a billion people. In recent decades, intra-
state warfare has scarred several regions of Africa. In the Great Lakes, Darfur-Chad, Somalia, 
and both the broader Sahel and Lake Chad regions, warfare has triggered complex security, 
humanitarian and developmental crises, prompting extensive multilateral assistance. The 
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historical context is similarly dissimilar:  two EU states, the UK and France, created the 
boundaries of the majority of African states and retain, at a minimum, a paternalistic interest 
in their welfare.  Paris, continues to maintain a substantial range of military and economic 
ties on the continent.  Consequently, EU security policy towards Africa is necessarily 
complex, even before taking into account the ties of individual African states with major 
powers such as the US and China, both of whom have significantly increased their military 
presence in Africa recently.   
Do the EU security strategies for Africa exhibit the characteristics of internal 
consistency or comprehensiveness? The short answer is no. This negative assessment is 
largely owed to the wide range and complexity of the policies that the EU undertakes in 
Africa. Certainly in terms of successive strategy presentations, common themes are apparent, 
notably those of ‘partnership’ and the promotion of regional cooperation within Africa. The 
latter occurs via regional bodies such as the IGAD in the Horn or via the AU itself. The EU 
invests considerable resources in supporting the AU Commission in general, and AU 
peacekeeping missions in particular. However, given the wide range of other EU actions, 
notably in the realms of aid and trade, cross-programme consistency is often lacking, despite 
the adoption of regional strategies and the appointment of Special Representatives. As noted 
both at the outset and in discussion of the impact of EU policies on the continent, the addition 
of a growing number of EU migration monitoring and control policies, particularly since 
2015, generates additional contradictions. 
Does the EU have an autonomous security presence in Africa? Again, the response 
appears to be negative, despite the fact that the majority of CSDP military missions have been 
in Africa, launched principally under the Petersberg tasks of crisis-management and 
humanitarian support.  In most cases EU forces have intervened within a multilateral 
framework, most often at the behest of France. Indeed, the central political and logistical role 
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of France in CSDP military missions in Africa, such as in those in Chad, Mali and CAR, is 
clear. 
21
  
However, two exceptions suggest an emerging degree of autonomy from individual 
member state interests. The chapter has highlighted recent strategic shifts towards EU support 
for African security actors, via its APSA and APF financing. This has seen emphasis on the 
training of African forces on the continent, supporting AU forces in Somalia (AMISOM) and 
similar initiatives in Mali (AFISMA, from 2013), Central African Republic (MISCA, from 
2014), and the Lake Chad basin. In all of these cases, the EU has emerged as an actor of 
some substance though in financial rather than military terms. A second area where the EU 
has established a degree of real autonomy has been via its pooling of naval resources in the 
anti-piracy patrols of EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Here the longevity and relative precision of the 
mission’s objectives have helped create a degree of real operational autonomy and 
cohesiveness. EU naval patrols in the Indian Ocean, as those subsequently begun in the 
Mediterranean, also indicate the translation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy into 
practice is re-defining operational spectrum of CSDP tasks beyond those agreed upon at 
Petersberg.  
Given the scale of EU expenditure in Africa, is the EU itself treated as if it were a 
state actor on the continent? While not unambiguously so in a security sense, clearly both its 
putative and actual capabilities as a humanitarian and development actor are globally 
significant. Thus CSDP missions in fragile, aid-dependent African states, alongside those by 
DEVCO or DG ECHO, give the EU a significant profile alongside other multilateral aid 
actors, including various UN agencies, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. 
In terms of its professed strategy towards Africa, several obvious ambiguities and 
specificities remain. While the notion of ‘partnership’ has been particularly prominent in 
strategy discourse since the 2007 JEAS, the idea that the term genuinely reflects a strategic 
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“consensus on values, interests and strategic objectives” (Tardy 2016:1) between EU and 
African leaders seems tenuous at best.  
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Endnotes 
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1 While CFSP is the formal title of the post-Maastricht ‘pillar’ of EU foreign policy, in 
practice much of what is discussed here relates to Common Security and Defence Policy 
(formally a sub-component of CFSP). For consistency, the acronym CSDP will be used 
throughout this article.  
2 In January 2017, over 80 percent of the UN’s 117,000 peacekeepers deployed globally were 
in its nine on-going missions in Africa. Figures available via: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml.  
3 For example the EU-Rwanda strategy is contained in the 2014-2020 National Indicative 
Programme for Rwanda, available via: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pin-rwanda-
fed11-2014_en.pdf. That of Ethiopia, covering 2014-2020, is available via: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-ethiopia-20140619_en.pdf.  While the 
latter opens with a paragraph on ‘strategy’, peace and regional security get only a perfunctory 
mention.  
4 The ACP grouping comprises 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states under the ‘ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement’; 48 states are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
5 The EEAS also has a Gulf of Guinea strategy, since 2013, spurred by maritime and piracy 
issues. Also Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) exist for Central Africa and West 
Africa. The latter are available via: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/328/africa-and-the-eu_en#Central+Africa+and+the+EU  
7 Mr Angel Losada has been European Union Special Representative for the Sahel since 
November 2015; Alexander Rondos, Special Representative for the Horn of Africa since 
2012.  
8 Details the April 2016 parliamentary debate are available via: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1432400&t=d&l=en 
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9 Tardy 2015 provides a concise overview of CSDP actions in Africa. For other case studies, 
see Grevy, et al. 2009. 
11 In November 2016, the European Council extended Atalanta’s mandate to December 
2018. Details are available via: http://eunavfor.eu/european-unions-counter-piracy-operation-
atalanta-extended-by-two-years-to-help-ensure-pirate-attacks-on-seafarers-off-coast-of-
somalia-remain-suppressed/ 
12 Styan (2016) drawing on Germond and Smith (2009?. 
13  Details on Operation Sophia are available via: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eunavfor_med_-_mission_14_february_2017_en.pdf. 
Operation Triton, a second EU Mediterranean naval policy, is run by Frontex as part of EU 
Home Affairs policy. 
14  These include the substantive US military presence; both AFRICOM’s Djiboutian base 
and its extensive outreach activities. See Styan 2013 for the interaction between French, US 
and EU militaries in the Horn. 
15 Details are available via: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/relations-eeas-eu-institutions-and-
member-states_en 
16 Tejpar and Zetterlund (2013: 31) note that the CSDP’s budget is under five percent of total 
EU external relations’ expenditure. This in turn is barely 0.2 percent of total EU expenditure.    
17 Details available via: www.eucap-som.eu. Problems outlined in Tejpar and Zetterlund 
2013 continued through much of Eucap-Nestor’s lifespan. The revamped mission operates 
within the Horn’s ‘EU Comprehensive approach’ alongside Navfor-Atalanta, EUTM 
Somalia and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), under the auspices of the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). 
18  By convention the head of UN Peacekeeping Operations has been French. 
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19  The Valetta initiatives can be found via: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/ 
20 Details available via: http://eeas.europea.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/12336/managing-migration-effectively-hrvp-mogherini-reports-progress-5-key-
partner-countries_en  
21  The United Kingdom, both as the other lead ex-colonial power and the only other EU 
military force with significant power projection capacity in Africa, has by contrast taken a far 
less prominent role in either recent external military intervention in Africa or the EU Security 
strategy. The sole major CSDP role has been as host the Operational HQ of the Eunavfor 
Atalanta anti-piracy force. The UK has been active diplomatically over multilateral 
diplomacy and assistance towards Somalia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
